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TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS &
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTES:
ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION
Jacquelyn Silva*
Individuals working for transnational corporations face immense
challenges in securing their fundamental rights and receiving remedy
for corporate abuses. Inversely, transnational corporations face various
risks against their social responsibility when they prioritize their
operations and profits. Current international law efforts have been
assessing ways in which to impose human rights obligations on
companies more directly. Any such imposition of human rights
protections advances the necessity of considering the mechanisms
available to resolve such disputes, especially given that litigation in
international “courts” is not available for this purpose. Until an
international forum is established, challenges remain in confronting
human rights disputes against transnational corporations, including
jurisdictional constraints and methods of enforcement. This Article will
assess the existing landscape of dispute resolution and enforcement as
concerning transnational entities and will highlight arbitration and
mediation as alternate approaches for achieving structured respect and
authority for international human rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every person is fundamentally entitled to basic human rights.1
Under international human rights law, codified in state constitutions and
international treaties,2 states are obligated to protect individuals from
having these rights infringed upon. However, there exists a lack of
enforcement at the corporate level for adherence in abiding by these
protections.
These gaps, as they pertain to corporate social
responsibility, remain a central focus of international human rights
activism. While many international organizations are dedicated to
promoting and upholding human rights,3 legal challenges remain in
achieving justice and redress for violations committed by transnational
corporations. Despite being considered ‘legal persons,’4 corporations
pose problems for parties seeking to litigate, including jurisdictional
constraints and the absence of binding authority. In this regard,
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms may prove more
accessible and responsive to human rights victims bringing claims
against such entities.
While participation in the international market presents appealing
opportunities for corporate expansion, such transnational development
implicates both social and legal risks and calls for an increased
understanding of different environments, cultures, and trade practices.
Accordingly, human rights obligations in the business sector have
increasingly gained attention by international law efforts. 5 Leading
companies are working to better understand integration abroad in order
to account for coordination problems and address their systemic

1. What are human rights?, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2021)
(“These universal rights are inherent to us all, regardless of nationality, sex, national or ethnic
origin, color, religion, language, or any other status.”).
2. See, e.g., U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS (1791); see also The Core International Human
Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/coreinstruments.aspx
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
3. See
Human
Rights
Organizations,
GEO.
L.
LIBR.
(2020),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/human-rights-institute/human-rights-oncampus/internships-and-career-planning/human-rights-organizations/.
4. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also José E.
Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1,
9-16 (2011) (stating that the international investment regime has reasoned that corporations
and other investors are international legal persons or subjects of international law).
5. See generally Protect Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/ourwork/protect-human-rights (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); Corporations, AMNESTY INT’L,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/corporate-accountability/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2021).
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impacts.6 Therefore, it is essential for transnational corporations to
closely consider the local laws and policies of their foreign subsidiaries
and to make strong contracting decisions in anticipation of disputes.7 At
the same time, corporations, too, find themselves benefiting from ADR
alternatives.
Current globalization trends reveal that roughly “one fourth of total
global production is exported.”8 Such trade patterns naturally impose
stress on corporate decision making, an impact that strains the attention
of corporate efforts to consistently meet demand shifts for maximum
profit gain.9 Accordingly, foreign investments arising out of the Global
North are known to target opportunities in the Global South,10 based on
the latter having a weak rule of law and operating below international
standards.11 In such an environment, a great deal of human rights
violations are underreported or overlooked, presenting a system that
Northern investors can exploit, and in turn, avoid the costs of socially
responsible operations.12
Currently, only non-binding standards outline the values and
procedures for businesses to follow, including requirements to abide by
international law and respect human rights.13 In the absence of binding
legal authority, as well as the complexities involved in litigating
international human rights claims, it is essential to consider how ADR
6. Julie Davoren, Transnational Organization Structure, HOUS. CHRON.,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/transnational-organization-structure-60691.html (last visited
Apr. 19, 2021) (emphasizing the importance of business structure and coordination in global
integration and local responsiveness).
7. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct
to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389 (2005); see also DETLEV F. VAGTS ET
AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 127 (6th ed. 2019) (“[Transnational
corporations] enjoy a greater flexibility in organization. They may organize their managerial
structure . . . to achieve the proper balance of global efficiency and local sensitivity.”).
8. See Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Diana Beltekian, Trade and Globalization, OUR WORLD
DATA (2014), https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization.
9. Id.
10. See Lucia Gómez, Ronald Wall & Päivi Oinas, Foreign Investments in the Peripheral
Global South, in THE STATE OF AFRICAN CITIES 2018: THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICAN
INVESTMENT 320 (2018); see also Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S.
Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1142
(stating that corporations operating in less developed regions are known for “pursuing profit
at the expense of the weakest individuals”).
11. Rule of Law and Development, UNITED NATIONS & RULE L.,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-development/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
12. Corporations, supra note 5 (“Companies are taking advantage of weak regulatory
systems, especially in developing countries, and it is often the poorest people who are most at
risk of exploitation.”).
13. See generally UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
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mechanisms like arbitration and mediation may remedy gaps in
corporate accountability and succeed in correcting corporate human
rights abuses. 14 Part II begins by outlining the historical developments
of international human rights law and its applicability to transnational
corporations. Part III addresses the legal problems associated with
international corporate accountability. Finally, Part IV considers the use
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, like arbitration and
mediation, and addresses how they may be considered in the context of
enforcing human rights in international business practices.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
The development of human rights policies over time reveals the
increasing significance of this area and mounting support on behalf of
international actors. Beginning with the development of the United
Nations (UN), and fast-forward to current international treaties, the
human rights regime has continued its momentum of international
human rights enforcement. Through this evolvement, international law
has maneuvered the imposition of human rights obligations on the
business sector. While the corporate structure has long been perceived
as having evaded such social responsibilities, current efforts have
worked to close the gaps to allow means for holding transnational
corporations accountable.
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Following the catastrophic world events of the Holocaust and
World War II, the UN was developed in 1945 to foster international
peace and prevent future conflicts.15 These tragic events revealed the
human catastrophes resulting from nonintervention and urged the
creation of a collaborative international body to promote and protect
human rights.16 The UN, operating under the UN Charter, has since
aimed to safeguard global fundamental human rights “for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”17—encompassing
14. See Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why It
Doesn’t Work and Why It Does, HARV. BUS. REV. (1994), https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternativedispute-resolution-why-it-doesnt-work-and-why-it-does.
15. What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L UK (Oct. 21,
2017, 12:44 AM), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/universal-declaration-human-rights-UDHR.
16. Protect Human Rights, supra note 5 (citing to the UN Charter, “[m]aking the
promotion and protection of human rights a key purpose and guiding principle of the
Organization.”).
17. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 214 (2nd ed. 2009).
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“every individual and every organ of society.”18 Through this
mechanism, human rights became a collective concern of the
international community.19 Today, 193 sovereign states are official
members of the UN, with the latest member, South Sudan, being
admitted in July 2011.20 Only two non-member states remain, although
both have received standing invitations to participate as observers.21
In December 1948, three years after the UN was established, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was proclaimed by the
General Assembly.22 The UDHR officially recognized and delineated
thirty “fundamental human rights [and freedoms] to be universally
protected” by all UN member states.23 Since its publication, the UDHR
has inspired the creation of over eighty human rights instruments and
continues to “form the basis for all international human rights law.”24
In 1966, two international human rights treaties, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)25 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),26 were
created to implement the codified rights of the UDHR as binding on all
ratifying states.27 Together, these three documents make up what is

18. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of
Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 25 (1999)).
19. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 215.
20. Growth
in
the
United
Nations
Membership,
UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); see
also South Sudan, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states/southsudan (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (“The Republic of South Sudan formally seceded from
Sudan on 9 July 2011 as a result of an internationally monitored referendum held in January
2011, and was admitted as a new Member State by the United Nations General Assembly on
14 July 2011.”).
21. Non-member States, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/nonmember-states (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (“Non-member States, [State of Palestine and Holy
See], having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the
work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent observer missions at
Headquarters.”).
22. G.A. Res. 217 A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948),
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html.
23. Id.
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22; What is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15.
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
26. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
27. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, FACT
SHEET
N O.
2
(REV.1),
THE
INTERNATIONAL
BILL
OF
RIGHTS,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf (last visited Apr. 19,
2021).
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known as the International Bill of Human Rights.28 The United States
became a signatory of both binding instruments in 1977, but has only
ratified the ICCPR.29 In total, twenty-six sovereign nations have not yet
ratified the ICESCR, and twenty-four have not yet ratified the ICCPR;30
this reveals the enduring gaps in the incorporation of binding human
rights laws for which such claims can be brought.31
Moreover, existing human rights treaties do not generally impose
legal obligations on states to regulate business entities.32 Without the
full implementation of the International Bill of Human Rights, along
with the general problems associated with upholding international laws
in national jurisprudence, great barriers remain for litigating human
rights claims against corporate actors. Still, these instruments barely
scrape the surface when addressing the problems associated with
corporate liability in international law for human rights.33
B. The UN Global Compact
The complexities involved in the growth of the corporate sector
have continued to create newfound economic pressures and demands,
encouraging the evasion of social responsibility. The 1990s marked a
significant period of technological growth and connectivity, the effects
of which led to the anti-globalization movement.34 In response, the UN
Global Compact was organized and implemented in July 2000 to address
the widespread concerns on the negative impacts of corporate business
practices on human rights and the environment.35

28. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 215; see generally UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.
OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948),
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/compilation1.1en.pdf.
29. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF.
HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
REPORTING
FRAMEWORK
(Sept.
2017),
https://www.ungpreporting.org/resources/the-ungps/ [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
33. Globalisation and Human Rights, INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS.,
https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/globalisation-human-rights/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
34. See Christian Fuchs, Antiglobalization, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/antiglobalization (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (“[The
Antiglobalization Movement was a] social movement that emerged at the turn of the 21st
century against . . . a model of globalization based on the promotion of unfettered markets and
free trade.”).
35. Rorden
Wilkinson,
Global
Compact,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-Compact (last updated May 17, 2016).
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The Compact aims to encourage good business practices through
corporate commitments to support UN goals.36 Through its voluntary
framework, the Compact relies on CEO pledges to implement universal
sustainability principles and general member adherence to ten nonbinding principles of business.37 These principles are derived from
major international instruments, including the UDHR.38 Due to the
Compact’s voluntary nature, enforcement of the business principles
“relies on public accountability, transparency, and enlightened selfinterest.”39
The Compact has attracted the participation of over 13,000 entities
pledging a commitment to protecting human rights and social
sustainability.40
However, many transnational corporations are
suspected of participating in the Compact only to provide reputational
protections for conducting business in places having a weak rule of
law.41 Such unregulated environments are associated with having high
levels of poverty and inequality and are, therefore, more likely to allow
human rights abuses.42 Thus, participation in the Compact may give the
impression that an entity is committed to good business practices,
although this commitment is without enforcement.
C. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
In 2005, the UN Secretary General appointed John G. Ruggie to
serve as the Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.43
Ruggie, a Harvard professor specializing in human rights and
international affairs, had previously assisted the Secretary General in
establishing and overseeing the UN Global Compact.44 Ruggie’s
appointment included a fact-finding mandate to identify and clarify the
standards of corporate responsibility with regard to human rights in order
36. About the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
37. Id.
38. Wilkinson, supra note 35.
39. Id.
40. Our
Participants,
UNITED
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
41. Will
Kenton,
United
Nations
Global
Compact,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/un-global-compact.asp (last updated Apr. 20, 2020).
42. See Rule of Law and Development, supra note 11.
43. John Ruggie, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/johnruggie (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); see also Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General
Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights,
Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Press Release SG/A/934 (July
28, 2005), https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sga934.doc.htm [hereinafter Secretary-General
Appoints John Ruggie].
44. Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie, supra note 43.
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to “strengthen the human rights performance of the business sector
around the world.”45 In March 2011, after six years of conducting
extensive research and consultations, Ruggie issued the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).46
Ruggie described the UNGPs as the “end of the beginning,”
intending the instrument to serve as an initial guide, giving future
business and human rights efforts something to build off of.47 The
UNGPs ultimately “provide an authoritative global standard for
preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights
linked to business activity.”48 Only one month after being published, the
UN Human Rights Counsel unanimously endorsed the UNGPs.49 This
was significant in endorsing business adherence to the principles by all
entities operating within the territory or jurisdiction of UN member
states.50
The UNGPs are premised on a non-binding, three-pillar
framework: protect, respect and remedy.51 The first pillar pertains to the
state’s “duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,
including businesses[;]” the second calls on “corporate responsibility to
respect human rights[;]” and the third validates “greater access by
victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.”52 This
three-part model is “grounded in social expectations and thus not based
on or meant to create new legal norms.”53 Notably, the UN High
45. John G. Ruggie: Berthold Beitz Research Professor in Human Rights and
International Affairs, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. CARR CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. POL’Y,
https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/people/john-ruggie (last visited May 2, 2021).
46. Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie, supra note 43.
47. Shane Darcy, Key Issues in the Debate on a Binding Business and Human Rights
Instrument,
BUS.
&
HUM.
RTS.
IR.
(Apr.
13,
2015),
https://businesshumanrightsireland.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/key-issues-in-the-debate-ona-binding-business-and-human-rights-instrument/.
48. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, THE UN
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RELATIONSHIP TO UN GLOBAL
COMPACT COMMITMENTS
(2014),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latestnews/pdf-the-un-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights-relationship-to-unglobal-compact-commitments/.
49. THE UN WORKING GROUP ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UN GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 2,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/Intro_Guiding_PrinciplesBusinessHR.pd
f (last visited May 10, 2021).
50. See id.
51. UN “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, BUS. &
HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretarygenerals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedyframework-and-guiding-principles (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
52. Id.
53. BUSINESS, PEACEBUILDING AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 29 (Jason Miklian,
Rina M. Alluri & John E. Katsos eds., 2019).
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Commissioner promoted the UNGPs as a “ ‘ global authoritative
standard, providing a blueprint for the steps all states and businesses
should take to uphold human rights.’ ” 54
Ruggie recognized the international treaty making process to be
slow and faced with “monumental challenges.”55 The extensive process
required in finalizing a binding instrument, coupled with the timeline for
getting enough ratifying states for it to become enforceable, would have
allowed for several corporate human rights violations to occur
unaffected by a lack of international standards.56 This concern motivated
the issuance of a non-binding instrument to avoid prolonging the
publication of international business standards, which he considered
essential to the human rights landscape.57 In this way, the UNGPs were
introduced to serve as a guideline for incorporation by both business and
state practices.
Ultimately, the UNGPs are commitment free, meaning any efforts
to incorporate them into business practices are legally unenforceable.58
Without binding authority, victims of human rights abuses have limited
means of achieving legal recourse, and businesses are not being held
accountable.59 Additionally, national courts have shied away from
hearing international human rights claims involving foreign parties and
corporations.60 Having recognized this downfall, in June 2014, the UN
Human Rights Council voted by a majority to begin developing a
binding instrument inspired by the UNGPs to establish corporate
liability and correct human rights violations by business entities.61

54. John Gerard Ruggie, The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on
Business & Human Rights (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working Paper
No. 67, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/social-construction-un-guidingprinciples-business-human-rights.
55. Darcy, supra note 47.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See Binding Treaty, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/big-issues/binding-treaty/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
59. See id.
60. See Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr.
2013),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-02-05/long-arminternational-law.
61. John Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN Business and Human
Rights Treaty, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & BUS. (July 8, 2014), https://www.ihrb.org/other/treatyon-business-human-rights/the-past-as-prologue-a-moment-of-truth-for-un-business-andhuman-rights-tre/?; see also Nadia Bernaz, Opinion, The Draft UN Treaty on Business and
Human Rights: the Triumph of Realism over Idealism, BUS. & HUM. RTS. CTR. (Aug. 21,
2018),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/the-draft-un-treaty-on-business-andhuman-rights-the-triumph-of-realism-over-idealism.
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D. Proposed Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights
Since the anti-globalization movement of the 1990s, government
failures to prevent human rights atrocities have flooded news headlines,
and called on the attention from the international community to close
these gaps.62 In 2013, business and human rights issues returned to the
UN agenda after the Human Rights Council expressed “the necessity of
moving forward toward a legally binding framework to regulate the
work of transnational corporations and to provide appropriate protection,
justice and remedy to the victims of human rights abuses.”63 In June
2014, a UN Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) was formed to
begin developing a binding instrument modeled after the UNGPs.64
In July 2018, the IGWG released the first draft of the Treaty on
Business and Human Rights, termed the “Zero Draft.”65 This was the
first international effort to create an “overarching international legal
framework . . . governing business conduct in relation to human
rights.”66 However, this treaty draft was problematic because it focused
solely on businesses of “transnational character.”67 This led to legal
uncertainty and provided businesses with the capacity to exploit and
avoid liability through reclassification.68 By October 2018, ninety-four
states and four hundred civil society organizations participated in the
fourth session of the IGWG—displaying an increase of interest and
support for the Treaty’s development.69 Treaty negotiations remain
ongoing, with its latest revision having been published in August 2020,
and the sixth session of the IGWG held in October 2020.70 Of course,
future negotiations will be essential to human rights by ensuring access
to justice and remedies for populations affected by transnational
corporate actors.

62. See generally Adam Warden, A Brief History of the Anti-Globalization Movement,
12
U.
MIAMI
INT’L
&
COMP.
L.
REV.
237
(2004),
https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1082&context=umiclr.
63. Olga F. Sixto, Business and Human Rights: A Study on the Implications of the
Proposed Binding Treaty 3 (Oct. 2015) (unpublished LLM manuscript) (on file with author).
64. Ruggie, supra note 61.
65. Binding Treaty, supra note 58.
66. Ruggie, supra note 61.
67. See John G. Ruggie, Opinion, Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty on Business &
Human Rights, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/blog/comments-on-the-zero-draft-treaty-on-business-human-rights/
[hereinafter Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty].
68. See id.
69. Antonella Angelini, The Way Ahead for a UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights,
FAIR OBSERVER (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/un-treatybusiness-human-rights-brumadino-dam-collapse-news-15215/.
70. Binding Treaty, supra note 58.
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The intended purpose of the Treaty will be to close the
accountability gaps for human rights violations committed by business
entities,71 while also imposing legally binding obligations on states to
provide victims with a remedy for violations of their rights.72 The Treaty
rules are intended to be enforced through domestic state efforts and to
further promote the strengthening of international cooperation in the
domains of business and human rights.73 Although enforcement
mechanisms remain problematic for international treaties, developing
hard law accountability in this area is a step in the right direction.
III. A LEGAL OVERVIEW: THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS OF CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
Despite the work of the UN and the existence of various human
rights instruments, 74 international treaties do not yet impose direct legal
obligations on business entities, thus leaving this area of enforcement
largely to the states.75 While ratifying governments are expected to
implement international human rights law into their domestic systems,
there remain obstacles in domestic enforcement of such claims.76 The
treaty ratification process requires national governments to “put into
place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty
obligations.”77 However, within the implementation process, the
strength of international treaties are not conveyed in national courts. In
many states, difficulties remain regarding the general recognition of all
fundamental human rights as well as their legal enforcement.78
For instance, federal courts in the U.S. began to avoid hearing such
cases, which are perceived to implicate separation-of-powers and
71. See OEIGWG CHAIRMANSHIP REVISED DRAFT 16.7.2019, at art. 2,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_Revise
dDraft_LBI.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies,
UNITED
NATIONS
HUM.
RTS.
OFF.
HIGH
COMMISSIONER,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited
Apr. 19, 2021).
75. Guiding Principles, supra note 32.
76. Id.
77. International Human Rights Law, DIAKONIA INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. CTR.,
https://www.diakonia.se/en/IHL/The-Law/International-Law1/International-Human-RightsLaw/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
78. See Rosa Freedman, The Lack of Basic Human Rights Around the World: A
Harrowing Reality, INDEP. (Dec. 10, 2014, 12:33 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/health-and-families/features/the-lack-of-basic-human-rights-around-the-world-aharrowing-reality-9913644.html.
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foreign policy concerns.79 In 1980, Filartiga80 emerged as a landmark
case for human rights litigation in the U.S.81 This decision established
that victims of human rights abuses, including those committed abroad,
could use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)82 to sue perpetrators in U.S.
courts.83 To pursue this course of action, plaintiffs would first need to
meet the strict burden of establishing jurisdiction over the defendant.84
Here, the Filartiga Court determined that “a state . . . has a legitimate
interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among those within its
borders.”85 Despite this effort to provide a national forum for foreign
litigants, the U.S. received political backlash from nations reinforcing
their boundaries of nonintervention.86 In response, U.S. federal courts
began avoiding ATS claims and eventually restricting the legal reach of
the statute altogether.87 The U.S. poses as a great example of the
difficulties in cross-border litigation, even without taking into account
the additional challenge posed in hailing a corporate entity into court.
In considering work arounds to this issue, U.S. state courts and
international mechanisms remain seen as viable forums for human rights
cases. If able to navigate the substantive and jurisdictional constraints,88
private parties may be able to bring their human rights claims under state
law in domestic U.S. courts. Under proper circumstances, this process
does not require corporate consent to initiate,89 since a court having
jurisdiction may, in theory, hail the defendant into court. Thus, the
avenue of litigation may circumvent the difficulties posed in alternative
mechanisms requiring voluntary participation such as arbitration and
mediation.90 Without any incentive, such partaking on behalf of
79. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). The Court determined that
the transnational context of the dispute implicated risks to international comity. Id.
80. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
81. Id.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.”).
83. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (allowing victims of serious human rights abuses
abroad to sue under federal common law in federal court).
84. See id. at 887-88.
85. Id. at 885.
86. Roger Alford, The Diplomatic Friction of ATS Litigation, OPINIOJURIS (May 29,
2009), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/05/29/the-diplomatic-friction-of-ats-litigation/.
87. See id.
88. See Christopher A. Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance, 2 ST. JOHN’S J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 55, 56-60 (2012) [hereinafter Whytock, Transnational]; see also
Globalisation and Human Rights, supra note 33.
89. See, e.g., Romero v. Drumond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (exercising
jurisdiction over Colombian subsidiary defendant under the Alien Tort Statute).
90. See Jack J. Coe et al., Arbitration and Mediation in Cross Border Disputes:
Possibilities and Limitations, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 231, 237-49 (2019) (discussing the
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corporate defendants is not likely to be acquired.91 Alternatively, the
favorable biases of domestic courts towards host state actors are likely
to impact foreign parties from procuring a favorable judgment.92 Despite
this risk, parties may prefer the public nature of the litigation process,
allowing them to call attention to corporate abuses and access to obtain
reparations through legally binding judgments.
Similarly, an
international court could intend this judicial impact, while serving as a
more neutral forum for foreign litigants. Despite this, international
mechanisms are lacking in communitarian, transnational support,93
leaving national options more accessible to private parties.
A. Domestic Litigation: International Human Rights Claims Against
Corporations in U.S. Courts
A recognized leader of largescale judicial governance, U.S. courts
have been known to be “among the most influential” in handling
transnational disputes.94 However, in the effort to maintain diplomacy
and respect of territoriality, U.S. federal courts became reluctant to
entertain claims involving foreign parties. Accordingly, several recent
and notable Supreme Court rulings have largely restricted federal
jurisdiction over international human rights claims in the U.S.95
In the 2013 Supreme Court case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
96
Co., the federal court system constricted the reach of the ATS and its
ability to hear cases of international human rights against corporate
actors.97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiobel after the
Second Circuit held that corporations are not subject to suit under the
ATS because “corporate liability ha[d] not been established specifically

voluntary nature of alternate dispute mechanisms, including the voluntary nature of consentbased arbitration and voluntary convening for mediation).
91. There are apparent difficulties in relying on voluntary methods when corporations
are unlikely to consent to being sued nor voluntarily appear to defend themselves against
claims of human rights abuses. Thus, instigating corporate incentives to maintain business
relations or consumer interests may be considered among the possible incentives for ADR.
92. See generally Ronán Feehily, Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality in
International Commercial Arbitration, A Fine Balance in the Quest for Arbitral Justice, 7
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 88 (2019).
93. See generally Kamil Omoteso & Hakeem Yusuf, Accountability of Transnational
Corporations in the Developing World, 13 EMERALD PUBLISHING LIMITED 54 (May 26,
2016).
94. Whytock, Transnational, supra note 88, at 64.
95. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). Jesner and Kiobel cases placed strict judicial limitations
on Alien Tort Statute litigation against corporate defendants.
96. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
97. See id. at 124-25.
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as part of international law.”98 The Supreme Court ultimately held that
the case was barred under the presumption against extraterritoriality,
leaving unresolved the question of whether the ATS applied to suits
against foreign corporations.99 Similarly, the 2018 Supreme Court
decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank,100 established that “absent further action
from Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS
liability to foreign corporations.”101 This decision further restricted
federal jurisdiction and limited the legal recourse available to victims of
corporate human rights abuses.
These cases reveal the evolution of human rights claims in the U.S.
following Filartiga and the challenges of establishing personal
jurisdiction over corporations for human rights violations. The holdings,
made in an effort to curtail foreign policy implications, have left human
rights victims with limited options to obtain legal recourse under the
ATS.102 Similarly, petitioners have narrow alternatives to litigate in
federal court since few express private causes of action exist for
international human rights.103 Nevertheless, petitioners whose human
rights claims cannot be litigated in federal courts may still bring their
claims in state courts by establishing personal jurisdiction over a
corporate defendant.104 A court obtains official power to make such
legal decisions and judgments by a showing of either general or specific
jurisdiction over the defendant.105 Accordingly, the following sections
will outline both courses of jurisdiction.

98. Christopher A. Whytock, Donald E. Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword:
After Kiobel – International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law,
3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2013) [hereinafter Whytock, After Kiobel] (following the
Second Circuit opinion, in which the majority held that corporations were not subject to
international law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this question under
customary international law).
99. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125 (noting that nothing in the opinion limited Congress from
amending the ATS in order to bring corporate defendants within the courts’ jurisdiction).
100. Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
101. See id. at 1403.
102. Id. at 1408 (“[A]ny imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for
violations of international law must be determined in the first instance by the political
branches of the Government.”).
103. Whytock, After Kiobel, supra note 98, at 4 (noting the Torture Victim Protection Act
and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as express causes of action for international human
rights under U.S. federal law).
104. See id. at 6; see also VAGTS ET AL., supra note 7, at 141 (“Another method of holding
corporations accountable for the social . . . impacts of their activity is ordinary civil litigation
in domestic courts . . . The claims may allege violation of domestic tort or statutory law, or of
international law.”); id. at 142 (“There are many barriers to such claims, including limitations
on personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.”).
105. See Craig Sanders, Of Carrots and Sticks: General Jurisdiction and Genuine
Consent, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2017) (“A state’s jurisdictional power over
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1. General Jurisdiction in U.S. State Courts
A human rights victim may bring a claim in state court for conduct
occurring overseas by invoking general jurisdiction over a domestic
corporation. In Goodyear,106 the Supreme Court held that a corporation
is subject to the general jurisdiction of a state in which its contacts are
so “continuous and systematic” as to render a corporation “essentially at
home.”107 Following this outcome, the court in Daimler108 relied on
Goodyear to clarify that a corporation’s state of incorporation or
principal place of business renders it “at home” in the respective state
and therefore subject to its jurisdiction.109 In contrast, the BNSF110 Court
held that unrelated “in-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the
assertion of general jurisdiction” over a defendant corporation.111 Thus,
a human rights victim may bring a claim against a domestic corporation
for conduct occurring overseas in state court of the state only where the
corporation is considered “at home.”112
2. Specific Jurisdiction in U.S. State Courts
Another avenue for achieving personal jurisdiction over a
corporation is through specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction is
derived from a showing of “related contacts [that] took place in the
forum [state],” thus establishing “an affiliation between the forum and
the underlying controversy.”113 In McIntyre,114 the Court held that
asserting jurisdiction is lawful when the defendant “purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”115 Six years later, in
Bristol-Myers,116 the Court held that a “corporation’s ‘continuous
activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not enough to support the
demand that the corporation be amendable to suits unrelated to that

defendants is couched in either specific ‘conduct- linked’ jurisdiction or general ‘all-purpose’
jurisdiction.”).
106. Goodyear v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
107. Id. at 919.
108. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
109. See id. at 137 (citing Goodyear, 563 U.S. at 924).
110. BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
111. Id. at 1559.
112. Id.
113. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017); Patrick
J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court Human Rights Actions, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 45, 57 (2013).
114. McIntyre Machinery, LTD. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
115. Id. at 877.
116. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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activity.’ ” 117 Therefore, under specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff may
bring a claim against a foreign corporate defendant where there is a
strong finding of “the defendant’s relationship to the forum State” and
where “the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the
power of a sovereign.”118
Despite the barriers in the U.S. for litigating international human
rights claims in federal courts, state courts may provide a viable means
of remedy under private civil tort law. Still, other procedural and
substantive obstacles remain which may prevent victims from receiving
recourse through this avenue.119 For this reason, among others, it is
important to consider the use of neutral forums available to remedy and
prevent continuing corporate abuses. Accordingly, international dispute
resolution mechanisms present great potential to serve as neutral judicial
forums for this purpose.120
B. International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
When domestic laws fail to remedy human rights violations,
“injured parties may . . . resort to international mechanisms for
remedy.”121 However, the current international system is not yet
equipped to handle such cases involving corporate actors.122 While
human rights have been codified in international law,123 an international
court having jurisdiction over private party claims for corporate human
rights abuses is yet to be established. Without such means, the
enforcement mechanisms available for the protection of human rights at
the transnational level have proven inadequate. The International Court
of Justice and International Criminal Court are among the two most
recognized international tribunals still in existence; however, both have
restrictions that make them unavailable for this purpose.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established in 1945 to
settle legal disputes and provide advisory opinions for UN member
states.124 The ICJ, considered the principal judicial organ of the UN,
117. Id. at 1781.
118. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779; McIntyre Machinery, LTD., 131 S. Ct. at 873.
119. Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law
and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 17-20 (2013).
120. See id.
121. International Human Rights Law, supra note 77.
122. See generally David Scheffer, Corporate Liability under the Rome Statute, 57 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 35 (2016).
123. See International Law and Justice, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/globalissues/international-law-and-justice (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (outlining the development of
a body of international law and judicial organs).
124. The Court, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/court (last visited Feb. 7,
2021).
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only hears contentious cases between member states or states who have
otherwise accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. 125 Thus, private parties
have no right of access to obtain recourse for human rights abuses under
this mechanism.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals for the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.126 In addition to the
limited scope of claims for which the ICC has jurisdiction over, the
parties must also be citizens of state parties to the Rome Statute who
assent to the Court’s jurisdiction.127 Like the ICJ, the ICC remains
unavailable for the purposes of human rights judicial resolution against
corporate actors.
It is unlikely that a global forum for this purpose will be established
until there is further global participation in the enforcement of
international law for human rights. Without adequate international
support, social enforcement on corporations to abide by the UNHR and
respective human rights treaties may persist as the only multinational
scrutiny accessible to individuals—a social adjudication per se. As long
as corporations remain focused on generating profit for their
shareholders, they will remain responsive to the interests of their
consumer base and motivated to preserve their image and reputation in
competitive markets. In this way, the people’s collective voice may
serve best to demand change in the face of corporate neglect, especially
where the host state is not proactively protecting its citizens or corporate
settlements act to quiet any commotion.128 Meanwhile, the transition to
125. See John R. Crook, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 NW. J.
HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2004); see also How the Court Works, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icjcij.org/en/how-the-court-works (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (explaining that the International
Court of Justice is competent to hear legal disputes between States who are members of the
United Nations).
126. International Law and Justice, supra note 123 (explaining that jurisdiction for crimes
of aggression is contingent upon an agreement as to the definition of such a crime).
127. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-thecourt-works/Pages/default.aspx#legalProcess (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (explaining that the
ICC has jurisdiction over four main crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and crimes of aggression).
128. See, e.g., Apoorva Mandavilli, The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster Is Still
Unfolding,
ATLANTIC
(July
10,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/the-worlds-worst-industrial-disasteris-still-unfolding/560726/ (reporting that after a massive industrial gas leak in Bhopal, India,
American company, Union Carbide Corporation, continues to deny liability, leaving the
Indian Government to answer to the demands of human rights activists in the region); see also
Larisa Epatko, 5 years after the world’s largest garment factory collapse, is safety in
Bangladesh
any
better?,
PBS
(Apr.
6,
2018,
3:30
PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/5-years-after-the-worlds-largest-garment-factorycollapse-is-safety-in-bangladesh-any-better (reporting that in response to the globally
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considering more serious reliance on alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms is essential until states submit to international adjudication
for human rights.
IV. THE AVENUES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW ADR
MECHANISMS CAN BE USED TO HOLD TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Without an established international venue to litigate claims against
transnational entities,129 and in the absence of binding international
business standards,130 petitioners and activists are left to consider
alternative avenues to obtain legal recourse and reparations for human
rights violations. Considering that ADR mechanisms require voluntary
participation, petitioners must face the initial hurdle of navigating
corporate cooperation. This poses further difficulties when parent
corporations do not claim liability for the acts of their subsidiaries. In
this way, corporate accountability requires transparency regarding the
ownership and control of entities abroad.131 Such transparency is often
lacking in conflict environments, where parent companies may be less
accessible and are only responsible for answering on behalf of their
subsidiaries when a petitioner successfully pierces the corporate veil.132
After establishing liability, a corporation is still unlikely to avail
itself to ADR without incentive. The human rights regime may be most
successful in incentivizing such cooperation by targeting the reputation
of corporate entities and harnessing the support of the transnational
consumer base. Technological connectivity allows for immediate
communications and broadcasts aimed at protecting the dignity of
human rights against corporate abuses. In response, corporate actors are
likely to abide by resolution efforts to appeal to their consumer base and
retain shareholder profits.
Efforts to improve the administration of corporate social
responsibility continue to be of the utmost importance in the fight for
international human rights. Until there is a direct means of subjecting

recognized catastrophe of the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, corporate entities looking
to salvage their reputation formed alliances to ensure the safety of the factories that supplied
them).
129. See International Law and Justice, supra note 123.
130. See Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty, supra note 67.
131. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 7, at 129.
132. Péter D. Szigeti, Territorial Bias in International Law: Attribution in State and
Corporate Responsibility, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 311, 350 (2010) (“The required test
for a successful piercing of the corporate veil is that the subsidiary be a mere ‘instrumentality’
or an ‘alter ego’ of the mother corporation, where the subsidiary’s every action is decided in
fact by the owner.”).

886

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

corporations to legal enforcement and repercussions, an increased
understanding for ADR alternatives in the international context is
crucial. As a strong alternative to litigation in resolving disputes,133
ADR mechanisms have long been relied upon by corporate entities in
countries like the United States.134 To this effect, the American Bar
Association formed the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution in 1993, to
promote widespread educational efforts in ADR.135
These alternative resolution processes have proven to be flexible,
are voluntary, and provide parties with greater control over both the
resolution method and outcome.136 Ultimately aiming to a “achieve
peaceful resolution of disputes,”137 such mechanisms may appeal to the
needs of human rights claimants who otherwise face challenges
accessing recourse through litigation. Accordingly, developments in
ADR practice areas may further improve the cooperation and
receptiveness of transnational corporations who wish to avoid the costs
and publicity involved in litigation. Thus, it is in the global community’s
interests to explore these alternatives in the effort to close the loopholes
of corporate social responsibility as pertaining to the international
human rights regime. The following sections will discuss the benefits
that ADR alternatives present while focusing on arbitration and
mediation as reliable means for upholding the protections of the UN
Guiding Principles.
A. Arbitration
Arbitration is a neutral and private process in which disputing
parties “agree that one or several [arbitrators] can make a decision about
the dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments.”138 Arbitral
proceedings have gained attention and momentum as an efficient and
133. See Tala Esmaili & Krystyna Gilkis, Alternative Dispute Resolution, CORNELL L.
SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last updated June
2017).
134. See Darryl Geddes, U.S. corporations now widely use Alternative Dispute Resolution
over litigation to solve disputes, national survey shows, CORNELL CHRON. (May 21, 1997),
https://news.cornell.edu/stories/1997/05/survey-also-finds-lack-confidence-qualificationsarbitrators; see also Michael McManus & Brianna Silverstein, Brief History of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the United States, 1 CADMUS J. 100 (2011).
135. Anna Spain, Using International Dispute Resolution to Address the Compliance
Question in International Law, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 807, 821 (2009) (stating that ABA efforts
include, but are not limited to, hosting conferences and endorsing publications in areas of
arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and conciliation).
136. Esmaili & Gilkis, supra note 133.
137. Spain, supra note 135, at 810.
138. Dispute
Resolution
Processes:
Arbitration,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProces
ses/arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
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effective form of international dispute resolution. Largely motivated by
the globalization trends of the twentieth century, arbitration emerged as
a substitute for litigation in the effort to depoliticize the settlement of
disputes between multi-national parties.139 A mechanism providing
parties with control to establish the terms of resolving any potential
disputes, arbitration has become acknowledged for producing fair and
just outcomes in international commercial arbitration.140 The impartial
nature of arbitral proceedings presents an appealing alternative to
litigation, allowing parties to evade the local biases of a host country’s
foreign courts and laws.141 Arbitration is regarded as a less formal
process, “rarely impos[ing] specific qualifications in order to act as an
arbitrator.”142 Accordingly, it is not required that arbitrators be lawyers;
instead, arbitrators may be neutral experts in the relevant field of dispute,
such as scholars and professors or former judges.143 In addition, parties
to arbitration maintain a high degree of control over the organization and
outcome of the legal proceedings;144 they must agree on an appropriate
venue and select one or more unbiased arbitrators to hear both sides of
the case before issuing a final, binding decision.145 Petitioners may also
prefer the flexibility of arbitral proceedings and the potential to obtain
fast and affordable relief.146 Inversely, corporations may prefer the less
formal and more efficient process of arbitration, including the level of
confidentiality, and cooperation aiding the preservation of on-going
business relationships.147
The discretion and control which parties maintain under arbitration
eliminate many of the risks perceived of litigation while maintaining a
structured process and ensuring a binding award. An arbitral decision
usually cannot be appealed, contributing to faster procurement of
potential remedy.148 The 1958 New York Convention,149 ratified by a
139. Michael Faure & Wanli Ma, Investor-State Arbitration: Economic and Empirical
Perspectives, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 n.1 (2020).
140. Feehily, supra note 92, at 89.
141. See id. at 91.
142. Id. at 108.
143. See Esmaili & Gilkis, supra note 133.
144. See Aceris Law LLC, What is International Arbitration?, INT’L ARB.,
https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/what-is-international-arbitration/
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2021).
145. See id. While having one arbitrator is less costly, parties may feel more comfortable
with each having at least one member of the tribunal that they know will be sympathetic.
146. Dispute Resolution Processes: Arbitration, supra note 138.
147. See id.
148. Id. (“When arbitration is binding, the decision is final, can be enforced by a court,
and can only be appealed on very narrow grounds.”).
149. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Oct.
6,
1958,
330
U.N.T.S.
3,
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majority of countries,150 applies to provide a secured legal system and
enforce foreign arbitral awards for cross-border disputes.151 These
awards are considered final and are recognized and enforced by all
ratifying member states and tribunals.152 Arbitral tribunals are neutral
forums known for providing foreign parties a fair and efficient
procedural framework, free of local biases.153 The following sections
will discuss the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of
Arbitration and The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights
Arbitration, as two exemplary mechanisms of the interest to pursue
arbitral justice.
1. ICC International Court of Arbitration
The ICC International Court of Arbitration154 is considered one of
“the world’s leading institution[s] for providing international arbitration
services.”155 The ICC framework outlines the arbitral procedures to be
followed by parties to cross-border disputes,156 providing guidance
towards resolution and an essential structure for enforcing accountability
for corporate human rights obligations. The ICC arbitration rules
provide entities and private parties with flexible and efficient services to
resolve disputes and enforce their outcomes.157 A 2018 statistical report
revealed that the ICC has managed over 23,300 cases since its creation
in 1923.158
Although the ICC is considered a ‘court,’ it does not make formal
judgements and instead exercises judicial supervision of arbitration
proceedings to ensure proper application of the ICC rules.159 The arbitral
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards [hereinafter
N.Y. Convention].
150. Feehily, supra note 92, at 89 (reporting that over 150 states had subscribed to the
New York Convention by 2019).
151. See generally N.Y. Convention, supra note 149.
152. See id.
153. Susan L. Karamanian, The Role of International Human Rights Law in Re-Shaping
Investor-State Arbitration, 45 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO 34, 34 (2017) [hereinafter Karamanian I].
154. ICC International Court of Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER COM.,
https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-court-arbitration/ (last visited
Apr. 20, 2021).
155. Press Release, Dr. K. Chrysostomides & Co LLC, Dr. Kypros Chrysostomides
Appointed as a Member of the ICC International Court of Arbitration (July 26, 2012),
https://chrysostomides.mywebreview.com/index.php?pageid=28&pageaction=chr&modid=1
01&newid=130.
156. N.Y. Convention, supra note 149.
157. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2017 ICC DISPUTE RESOLUTION STATISTICS
51
(2018),
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2018/07/2017-icc-disputeresolution-statistics.pdf.
158. Id. at 52.
159. ICC International Court of Arbitration, supra note 154.
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awards are considered binding, final, and enforceable in courts
throughout the world.160 Generally, ICC arbitration ensures fewer
obstacles for international enforcement than decisions derived from
national courts; this is primarily because it is not unusual for national
courts to refuse recognition or enforcement of a judgment derived from
another sovereign state.161 Thus, arbitral awards prove more readily
accessible and contractual.
Arbitration is mostly a confidential process, meaning the general
public cannot attend the proceedings or view its record.162 Despite this,
the court may establish allowances for persons to attend the proceedings
or have access to materials of a case based on necessity.163 While some
records are accessible through the ICC’s website, these publications
usually omit items of party identification, trade secrets, and any other
sensitive information.164 In turn, arbitration is a great alternative for a
business entity wishing to maintain a reasonable degree of privacy over
a case and to avoid any exposure that could otherwise be injurious to
their reputation. Recent developments in ICC arbitration have allowed
for the limited publication of arbitration awards.165
In January 2019, the ICC published a notice indicating the
implementation of new policies to promote transparency and increase
efficiency in international arbitration.166 This transition is supported on
grounds to make the decision-making process accessible, to improve the
arbitral process generally, and to promote global trade.167 Still, award
publications are subject to party consent, therefore, parties may object to
any publication or may opt to have awards “anonymised or
pseudonymised.”168 This feature may be encouraging to corporate
defendants who may prefer arbitration for its confidentiality aspect.
160. 2021 Arbitration Rules, INT’L CHAMBER COM., https://iccwbo.org/disputeresolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2021).
161. See Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 150-51 (2013) (“Transnational litigants are . . .
more likely to encounter difficulties enforcing their foreign court awards than parties seeking
to enforce their foreign arbitral awards.”).
162. 2021 Arbitration Rules, INT’L CHAMBER COM. art. 8 (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_8.
163. See id.
164. See id. at art. 22.
165. Publication of ICC Arbitration Awards: 2019 Advancements in Transparency of ICC
Arbitration, ACERIS L. LLC. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.acerislaw.com/publication-of-iccarbitration-awards-2019-advancements-in-transparency-of-icc-arbitration/.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration Under the
ICC Rules of Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER COM. 8 (Jan. 1, 2019),
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/03/icc-note-to-parties-and-arbitraltribunals-on-the-conduct-of-arbitration.pdf.
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Alternatively, human rights claimants will likely favor greater
transparency in holding corporations accountable for international law
violations. Although awards are non-binding on preceding cases, such
publications may provide integral information for cases having similar
facts.169 Thus, the transition is likely to promote efficiency in the
determination and consistency of outcomes while maintaining its appeal
to private parties and business entities.
2. The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration
The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration were
established to “provide a set of rules for the arbitration of business and
human rights disputes.”170 In 2019, working sessions were held by the
Business and Human Rights Arbitration Working Group, a
representative group of over two hundred individuals, which recognized
arbitration as a mechanism having “great promise . . . to resolve human
rights disputes involving business.”171 Accordingly, the Drafting Team
set out to develop standards inspired by the Arbitration Rules of the
United Nations Commission International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).172
The Drafting Team acknowledged that disputes of international
human rights related to transnational corporations were being held in
national courts, which were subject to corruption and political influence,
or were generally unqualified to handle such disputes.173 In contrast,
arbitration offers “unique attributes that could serve . . . parties well even
where fair and competent courts are available.”174 After devoting five
years consulting with stakeholders and drafting text, the Drafting Team
officially launched the Hague Rules on December 12, 2019.175 The
intent behind this project was to close the remedy gap of the UNGPs by
establishing an “international private judicial dispute resolution avenue
available to parties involved in business and human rights issues.”176 In
this way, the Hague Rules are directly challenging the legal obstacles

169. See Karamanian I, supra note 153, at 38-39.
170. See CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION, THE HAGUE RULES ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS
ARBITRATION
1
(2019),
https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/The-Hague-Rules-on-Business-and-Human-RightsArbitration_CILC-digital-version.pdf [hereinafter CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION].
171. Id. at 1; The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration, CTR. FOR INT’L
LEGAL COOPERATION (2019), https://www.cilc.nl/project/the-hague-rules-on-business-andhuman-rights-arbitration/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2021) [hereinafter The Hague Rules].
172. CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION, supra note 170, at 3.
173. The Hague Rules, supra note 171.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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faced by victims of business-related abuses while also working towards
ascertaining transparency in proceedings and awards.177
Skepticism emerged from both business groups and civil society
towards a private adjudicative remedy for the resolution of human rights
claims and the challenge to arrive at rules that would appeal to multiple
stakeholders.178 However, the party discretion endorsed in arbitral
proceedings can be used by transnational corporations “to prevent abuse
from occurring in their supply chains and development projects.”179
This, in turn, may prevent future cases from arising and contributes to
the overarching goal of minimizing international law violations.180
The Hague Rules outline mechanisms that are consistent with the
UNGP pillars, addressing adverse human rights impacts under the
respect pillar and grievances consistent with the remedy pillar.181 The
Hague Rules principally follow the UNCITRAL rules, “with
modifications needed to address certain issues likely to arise in the
context of business and human rights disputes.”182 Arbitral institutions,
including the ICC, may serve as “an administrating or an appointing
authority under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.”183 With similarities
to the ICC rules of arbitration, the UNCITRAL rules provide a neutral
forum, maintain party confidentiality, and issue awards which “may be
made public in limited circumstances.”184 Additionally, in the
promotion of increased accessibility, the Rules are not limited by the
type of claimants, respondents, or subject-matter of the dispute.185
Despite the newfound potential for arbitral success in this area, the Rules
encourage the settlement of disputes by collaborative settlement
mechanisms such as mediation.186

177. See id.
178. See Diane Desierto, Why Arbitrate Business and Human Rights Disputes? Public
Consultation Period Open for the Draft Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights
Arbitration, EJIL:TALK! (July 12, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/public-consultation-perioduntil-august-25-for-the-draft-hague-rules-on-business-and-human-rights-arbitration/.
179. The Hauge Rules, supra note 171.
180. See id.
181. See CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION, supra note 170, at 13.
182. Id. at 3.
183. LATHAM & WATKINS’ INT’L ARBITRATION PRACTICE, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 18 (2019), https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/guide-to-internationalarbitration-2017 [hereinafter LATHAM & WATKINS].
184. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, COMPARATIVE CHART OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
RULES
(Apr.
19,
2016),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com//media/files/insight/publications/2016/04/comparative-chart-of-internationalarbitration/mm_london_comparativechart_apr16_updated.pdf?la=en.
185. See LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 183, at 12.
186. See CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION, supra note 170, at 3 (provisions on
facilitating settlement and mediation).
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3. Investor State Arbitration
Investor-State Arbitration (ISA), also known as Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), was initiated as an “unbiased arbitration
mechanism to resolve conflicts between states and foreign investors.”187
ISA has become an increasingly relied upon practice of dispute
resolution, proving protections that are imperative to entities seeking to
do business in foreign territory. 188 Under this mechanism, private
investors enter into either bilateral or multilateral agreements with
sovereign states to conduct business in their territory under agreed upon
terms, including governing dispute arrangements.189
Through
international investor agreements (IIAs) parties are considered as having
provided advance consent to arbitrate.190 The execution of IIAs
constitutes a promise on behalf of the State to “treat foreign investment
and investors in a certain, fundamentally fair, way.”191 This includes the
right not to have investor property expropriated without compensation—
a major concern of foreign entities and a primary incentive to enter into
such agreements.192
The investor-state arbitration process, established largely to protect
foreign investors’ interests against local power, provides a safeguard
against States who breach international standards.193 States must
therefore balance the protection of investor interests with their
international obligations under international human instruments.
Despite this, ISA is a “largely private system” which has been criticized
as “incapable of addressing matters of public concern such as human
rights.”194 Disputes arising out of IIAs are brought only on behalf of the

187. Emily Palombo, Evaluating a Permanent Court Solution for International
Investment Disputes, 532 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 799, 809 n.58 (2018) (instilling confidence
in access to recourse for potential disputes by “assur[ing] investors’ rights in countries with
poorly performing institutions, weak rule of law and high levels of corruption.”).
188. Karamanian I, supra note 153, at 34-36 (stating that since 1967, roughly 2,500
investor state agreements have been executed); see International Investment Agreements
Navigator,
UNITED
NATIONS
CONF.
TRADE
&
DEV.,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements (last visited Feb. 7,
2021); see also Palombo, supra note 187, at 800 (“Currently, different forms of ISDS are
included in over 3000 international agreements, and the number of cases referred to
international investment tribunals has increased.”).
189. See Karamanian I, supra note 153, at 36-37.
190. Id. at 34.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 37.
193. See generally id. at 34 (referring to the emergence of the investor-state arbitration
process which is “considered free of any local biases” and has “dominated how States treat
foreign investment and the consequences to States for breaching international standards”).
194. Susan L. Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 423, 424 (2013) [hereinafter Karamanian II].
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investor corporations and not by state governments.195 This places the
state in a defensive position and limits its ability to hold corporations
accountable for human rights abuses without inciting an action against
themselves. However, this approach may serve as a viable strategy for
states to uphold the human rights of their citizens to shed light on, and
ultimately uphold, such international standards.
In this way, a state would have to break the terms of their IIA to
retaliate for corporate abuses taking place in their territory. A corporate
investor may then bring a claim to be adjudicated under ISA against the
government under the terms of their bilateral agreement. In response,
the state may use the international law human rights standards to defend
its actions and uphold the fundamental rights of its people. Although
viable, this may not be effective considering how many underdeveloped
state governments “curtail human rights for the sake of economic
development.”196
There are other general concerns on behalf of state parties, which
perceive ISA as favorably biased towards investors.197 In addition, the
human rights regime raises concerns over the lack of public access to the
arbitral process, given that such cases constitute matters of public
concern.198 Criticism in this regard has considered this privatized effect
as “render[ing] the arbitration process incompatible with human
rights.”199 To combat this, recent agreements are recognized for
“includ[ing] specific provisions requiring arbitral proceedings to be open
to the public.”200 Accordingly, the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has begun to provide limited access to
published decisions.201 While not usually parties, citizens can be
beneficiaries of an arbitral award, allowing for the possibility for victims
to be heard in the proceedings.
Another challenge facing investor-state arbitration is the lower
predictability of outcomes given that “each arbitral tribunal may decide
a case . . . without regard to previous awards.”202 Both international
195. Karamanian I, supra note 153, at 38.
196. Boyd, supra note 10, at 1143.
197. See Faure & Ma, supra note 139, at 2-3 (“Developing countries, in particular, accuse
the ICSID-governed ISA system of being biased toward investors . . . . In response, the
European Union has proposed to replace ISA with a multilateral investment court, and this
idea has received support in academia.”).
198. Karamanian II, supra note 194, at 427.
199. Id.
200. Karamanian I, supra note 153, at 38-39.
201. Id. at 39.
202. Id. at 38-39 (“[T]ribunals are not bound to follow decisions of other tribunals;
nevertheless, tribunals cite to precedent and distinguish cases when not applying them as
precedent.”).
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human rights law and investment law are grounded in public
international law, derived from treaties and customary law.203 Ensuring
that arbitrators are well versed in international human rights law is one
method in which to close the gaps of this nature. Using investor-state
arbitration, private parties may direct their enforcement efforts to their
own governments to develop greater access to a viable platform to bring
their human rights claims against corporate entities.
B. Mediation
Another ADR mechanism, mediation, is a third-party negotiation
process held in a neutral forum where parties may “discuss and try to
resolve [their] dispute” prior to deferring to more formal processes.204
Through mediation, a settlement may be facilitated through negotiations
that take place with parties either together or separately.205 While a
mediator may conduct information gathering and suggest solutions, a
mediator “does not have the power to make a decision for the parties,”
as only the parties themselves may agree to a resolution.206 The
mediator, chosen by the parties, maintains a neutral role and does not
have a stake in the outcome of the dispute.207 Typically, a mediator is a
trained professional with relevant qualifications who helps parties find
common ground and assists in drafting a resolution which the parties
agree to; they do not have decision-making authority.208 The degree of
control which parties maintain in mediation contributes to the appeal of
this mechanism, providing parties with the confidence to secure a
resolution with which they are most comfortable.
Business leaders have been known to prefer mediation to resolve
commercial transaction disagreements in order to preserve relationships,
as well as to save time and money.209 The process provides parties an
opportunity to resolve their case by “understanding and evaluat[ing] . . .
each [party’s] position based on what that [party] has to say.”210 In this
203. Id. at 35.
204. Dispute
Resolution
Processes:
Mediation,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProces
ses/mediation/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
205. Steven C. Bennett, Court-Ordered ADR: Promises and Pitfalls, 71 PA. B. ASS’N Q.
23 (2000).
206. Dispute Resolution Processes: Mediation, supra note 204.
207. Id.
208. See id.; see also About Us, NAT’L ASS’N CERTIFIED MEDIATORS,
https://www.mediatorcertification.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2021).
209. See, e.g., Emily Doskow, Mediation for Small Businesses, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/mediation-small-businesses-29590.html
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2021).
210. Myles P. Hassett, Mediation is the New Trial, 54 ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2017, at 38, 40.
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way, mediation can be considered a more personable dispute resolution
process, in which it is perceived as “possible to have a ‘win-win
outcome.’ ” 211
With similarities to other ADR methods, mediation is especially
recognized for facilitating open communication and understanding
between parties.212 The process is voluntary, and the outcome is
nonbinding213—the biggest distinction from arbitration. Because the
outcome does not bind parties, they may ignore the result altogether or
seek a more favorable and binding outcome through an alternative
mechanism such as arbitration or litigation. While the confidence in
enforcement of mediation outcomes is not strong, it may pose a
favorable means to meet both parties’ needs, especially where a quick
resolve may allow for continued operations.
V. WHY ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MAY
BEST SERVE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMANTS
International human rights claims brought against corporate
defendants are generally comprised of complex issues involving various
applicable laws, language barriers, and cultural differences. Litigation
has traditionally been relied on as the primary judicial means of human
rights dispute resolution, thought to ensure a consistent procedural and
legal structure with outcomes governed by established rules.214
Additionally, parties who do not agree with a court’s decision may
appeal to a higher court, ensuring the prerogative of justice.215 However,
in considering all international coordination challenges, litigation may
ultimately prove unfavorable to both petitioning and defending parties
to a corporate human rights cause of action.
In comparison to alternative dispute mechanisms, litigation is
generally a longer process, requiring more financing and resources to be
carried out.216 Accordingly, a human rights petitioner will likely be
disadvantaged in bringing a claim against a corporate defendant that may
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Dispute Resolution Processes: Mediation, supra note 204.
214. Nicholas Hammond, The Difference Between Arbitration and Litigation, LEXOLOGY
(June 3, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a947e053-535b-417c-84982e8cc9c6cd13 (“The court has a definite and formal procedure for settling the conflict
between the parties concerned”).
215. Id.
216. Barbara Kate Repa, Arbitration Pros and Cons, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (last visited May 5, 2021) (“According to a
recent study by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, the average time from filing
to decision was about 475 days in an arbitrated case, while a similar case took from 18 months
to three years to wend its way through the courts.”).
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be more able to afford the associated time and costs of litigation.217
Additionally, trial proceedings are public; while a human rights claimant
may prefer this level of exposure, the publicity of court cases may
negatively affect the market dynamics of business entities. Thus, a
corporate defendant wishing to evade public access to sensitive
information or reputational harm may instead settle to avoid defending
the case on the merits. This potential outcome of litigation may prevent
a petitioner from having their day in court and being able to share their
story. Moreover, there are various procedural and substantive obstacles
involved in requiring a corporate defendant to appear in court,218 as well
as the potential difficulties faced in having judgment upheld which may
have been rendered in another state or under foreign laws.
Apart from domestic courts, there are few international tribunals
that hear human rights claims.219 From these, problems exist for
acquiring jurisdiction over claims against corporate defendants. The UN
Security Council established both the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 220 These tribunals provided an
international forum for humanitarian law, bringing justice to victims of
international crimes.221 These courts demonstrated how the procurement
of international justice was essential, leading to the creation of the
world’s first permanent International Criminal Court in 2002.222 The
217. See id. (“[R]esolving a case through arbitration is usually far less costly than
proceeding through litigation because the process is quicker and generally less complicated
than a court proceeding.”).
218. See generally Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 119.
219. See UN Documentation: International Law, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBR.,
https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last updated Jan. 26, 2021, 4:34 PM).
220. See The ICTR in Brief, UNITED NATIONS INT’L RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM.
TRIBUNALS, https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) [hereinafter ICTR]
(“The United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda to ‘prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.’ ” ); see also United Nations International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS INT’L RESIDUAL
MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIBUNALS, https://www.icty.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2021)
[hereinafter ICTY] (“The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
was a United Nations court of law that dealt with war crimes that took place during the
conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s.”).
221. See ICTR, supra note 220; see also ICTY, supra note 220.
222. See ICTR, supra note 220 (“[T]he ICTR has played a pioneering role in the
establishment of a credible international criminal justice system.”); ICTY supra note 220
(establishing how the ICTY laid a foundation for international justice, providing victims with
a voice and instilling accountability by perpetrators of humanitarian law); see also About,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited Feb. 7, 2021); see also INT’L
CRIMINAL COURT, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf.
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ICC, like the preceding ad hoc tribunals, only hears cases brought against
‘natural persons’ and therefore is not an available venue for transnational
business disputes.223 Generally, corporate criminal liability has not been
recognized under international law, although many states have made
efforts to extend their national jurisdiction to include corporate
defendants. 224 Despite the changes in the international climate,
motivating efforts to recognize corporate liability, the absence of a
legally binding international treaty or further legal authorizations has left
corporate litigation to occur mostly domestically.225
The challenges involved in multi-national corporate litigation have
encouraged the transitioning of legal efforts toward alternative dispute
resolution. ADR mechanisms are ways of settling disputes with the help
of a neutral third party. When used effectively, ADR may lower costs,
produce quicker resolutions, and preserve or improve relationships
among parties.226 The common forms of ADR include arbitration,
conciliation, negotiation, mediation, and collaborative law.227 By
utilizing ADR mechanisms, combined with the current status of
international human rights law, disputes against transnational
corporations may be resolved more effectively and efficiently.
Using this ADR mechanism, both petitioners and defendants
maintain a high degree of self-sufficiency, allowing parties to feel ‘in
control’ of their situation, process, and outcome. Finding a way to
complement this principle with stronger enforcement of international
human rights law is essential to the elimination of corporate abuses.
VI. STANDARDIZING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CASES
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Given the challenges facing human rights enforcement under
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, it is advisable that states from
the Global South consider feasible means by which to protect their
citizens and uphold basic human rights norms. A region known for
223. Scheffer, supra note 122, at 35.
224. Alessandra De Tommaso, Guest blog: Corporate criminal liability under
international
law,
KINGSLEY
&
NAPLEY
(Mar.
5,
2018),
https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/insights/blogs/criminal-law-blog/guest-blog-corporatecriminal-liability-under-international-law (stating that in 2014, member states of the African
Union adopted the Malabo Protocol to amend the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights to extend jurisdiction to international and transnational crimes and include
corporations as possible defendants).
225. Id.
226. Carver & Vondra, supra note 14.
227. Alternative
Dispute
Resolution,
LAW.
&
JURISTS
(2017),
https://www.lawyersnjurists.com/article/alternative-dispute-resolution-2/ (last visited Apr.
18, 2021).
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having a weaker rule of law, corporations from the Global North are able
to exploit resources and labor for their financial benefit with little to no
consideration of their social responsibly.228 Naming and shaming
methods are not good enough as corporations have been known to make
short-term adjustments only until their name is out of the media
spotlight.229
Despite existing cross-border coordination challenges, there are
alternative avenues that governments in the Global South could utilize
to vindicate human rights claims against corporations, including
domestic litigation, investor-state arbitration, and mediation. Using
these mechanisms, developing countries may increase their bargaining
power by contracting with corporate investors and requiring a committal
to ADR.230
Enforcement of international law presents various challenges,
particularly when handling cases involving actors belonging to states
that have not implemented international treaties. While ongoing efforts
are yet to solve these problems, the international human rights regime
cannot afford to be patient. History pertaining to this area has shown
that UN member states are committed to preventing fundamental human
rights violations.231 However, this commitment has been challenged by
corporate activity which has introduced new obstacles associated with
the enforcement of these rights.232 Litigation of claims can be costly and
time-consuming.233 Accordingly, it is important to develop a better
understanding of ADR mechanisms to target ways in which to best
address corporate accountability for international human rights.
Although the UNGPs inspired business entities to incorporate
socially responsible frameworks into their business models, there is no
228. Corporations, supra note 5; see WJP Rule of Law Index, WORLD JUST. PROJECT
(2019), https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/; Weak rule of law and lack of good
governance a major threat to development, says UNODC executive director, UNITED
NATIONS
(Nov.
15,
2013),
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/November/weak-rule-of-law-and-lack-ofgood-governance-a-major-threat-to-development-says-unodc-executive-director.html.
229. See, e.g., Scott W. Berg, The human cost of an iPhone, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2018,
10:10
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-human-cost-of-aniphone/2018/03/02/5d76555e-0b7e-11e8-8890-372e2047c935_story.html.
230. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 7, at 127-28 (citing UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT
REP. 2002, at 90 (2002)). It has been acknowledged that corporations of the Global North “are
bigger than many countries by comparing their sales to national GDPs.” Id. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development found that “ExxonMobil was slightly larger
than the economy of Pakistan and that General Motors was slightly larger than the economy
of Peru.” Id.
231. See generally HENKIN ET AL., supra note 17.
232. See generally Scheffer, supra note 122.
233. See Repa, supra note 216.
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legally binding obligation under international law to uphold them.234
Any corrective action taken in this context can be largely attributed to
motivations of receiving favorable media coverage, appeasing social
movements, and catering to market forces and domestic laws.235
Instances of continued human rights abuses reveal the necessity for
holding corporations accountable for their violations.
By using the aspects of more than one ADR mechanism, the
international community may begin to reveal the avenues most effective
to obtain recourse for victims. One possibility would be to establish a
collective process involving mediation and arbitration to find a middle
ground solution. This would begin with a form of mediation to foster a
private and collaborative environment for negotiation,236 and would
provide the opportunity to reach a settlement agreement before moving
forward to a process of arbitration. Having an arbitral hearing consistent
with the procedures set forth in ‘The Hague Rules on Business and
Human Rights Arbitration’ will provide the necessary structure to the
enforcement of human rights.237
Socialization of human rights may prove effective to pressure
corporate entities into proactive compliance with the codified
international standards. When the masses develop a voice in support of
good behavioral patterns, transnational entities will respond to remain
competitive and profitable. Such a combination of process would
encourage transnational corporations to settle claims to avoid moving
forward with a lengthy resolution process in which they must surrender
more of their control.238 Additionally, the incentive to settle may cater
to victims having more equal bargaining power than they would
otherwise. A human rights victim may be motivated to proceed to
arbitration for having a binding arbitral award be published, and
exposing the wrongdoer in a more officiated manner. Thus, by wanting
to avoid arbitration, a corporate defendant may be more willing to reach
a resolve which favors the interests of the victim. Maneuvering among

234. See Binding Treaty, supra note 58.
235. See Berg, supra note 229 (reporting that in response to the news of ‘troubling’ factory
conditions, Apple headquarters released public statements expressing their concern for the
situation and urgency to correct the problems, and that these supposed efforts were futile, and
only two years later, repeated incidents and protests erupted aimed at the continued
“substandard wage structure and work environment”); see also Steven F. Cahan et al.,
Corporate Social Responsibility and Media Coverage, 59 J. BANKING & FIN. 409-22 (2015).
236. See Bennett, supra note 205, at 23, 25 (describing increased reliance on ADR
mechanisms to reduce litigation associated delays and costs, while recognizing that ADR is
not a “cure-all for the ills of modern litigation.”).
237. See generally CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION, supra note 170.
238. See Dispute Resolution Processes: Arbitration, supra note 138.
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ADR alternatives, petitioners may find a pattern of success in this area
of enforcement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The complexities of transnational corporate entities pose significant
challenges to regulatory mechanisms.239 Due to the obstacles involved
in enforcement by traditional legal dispute resolution, ADR alternatives
such as arbitration and mediation may prove a more reliable means of
upholding the protections of the UNGPs. With the expansion of
globalization, putting pressure on the corporate sector, there is an
increased necessity for effective dispute resolution among the intricate
relationships of transnational corporations, investors, and states. ADR
may provide remedy for international human rights violations in places
where judicial proceedings are not available or effective. These
mechanisms have developed to allow parties from different legal,
linguistic, and cultural backgrounds to resolve their disputes in neutral
and fair settings.
While economic incentives in the global market continue to counter
corporate efforts to prioritize human rights,240 human rights victims
depend on the efforts of the international legal community to ensure that
these impacts are corrected. Although instruments such as the Draft
Treaty on Business and Human Rights and the Hague Rules on Business
and Human Rights Arbitration have only recently been made available
for reference, they provide great potential in the efforts to give “teeth”
to the UNGPs.241 Arbitral proceedings provide parties with the
flexibility to select procedures most appropriate for resolving
international human rights claims, while mediation provides a
collaborative operation to bring adverse parties together to remedy
human rights abuses committed by transnational corporations.
Additionally, transnational business entities may hold their subsidiary
partners accountable to meet their business responsibilities under the
UNGPs.242

239. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 7, at 126. OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises outline that such entities are “established in more than one country . . . [and are
not single entities], but rather a structure made up of many entities, each organized under the
laws of some nation and tied together by links of stock ownership or other contractual
agreements.” Id.
240. Monika Zalnieriute, Technology, Private Companies and Human Rights: Why The
Current International Legal Framework Isn’t Enough, OXFORD L. (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/11/technology-private-companiesand-human-rights-why-current.
241. See generally CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION, supra note 170.
242. Kenton, supra note 41.

2021]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTES

901

Thus, under current circumstances, the human rights regime may
rely on ADR alternatives as a modern approach to best overcome the
challenges involved in transnational corporate adjudication. This
avenue, providing neutral grounds for parties from different legal
systems and of mixed nationalities, may resolve claims against
transnational entities without fear of subjectivity by forum state courts
in the effort to preserve humanitarian interests and promote healthy
corporate relations.

